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Introduction
Ornette Coleman, in an interview with Jacques Derrida, said that he would rather have a
“human relationship” than a “musical relationship” with the philosopher. But who is to say that
these are two different types of relationships?
The musical and the human are intertwined through our understanding and internalization
of meaning, relationship to the external, and relationship to the internal. The minor sound of the
second movement of Beethoven’s seventh symphony can make someone break down in tears,
while the revelry of John Coltrane’s chord changes in “Giant Steps” can twist the listener’s mind
in curiosity, no matter how much or how little they know about music. Music, and at its core
simply sound, is a very human thing. The melody of your friend’s voice can make you calm, the
wail of sirens can make you anxious.
But how can we understand a musical relationship as a human relationship? It is not
always in meticulously planned out chords that we find the biggest release — perhaps it is in
what a musician does in the spur of the moment to change the course of the piece, to reveal their
own self through their interpretation.
We can understand improvisation as the act of creating, spur of the moment, an active
engagement with decision making and real-time ‘composition’ that allows for the musician to
add their own taste to a piece of music. Purely improvised music can be some of the most
exciting artwork to engage with, especially if you are witnessing it in real time, as you, the
listener, have no idea what twist the musician will take next. However, improvised music is not a
one-sided affair. In fact, it is a great example of the relationship between self and other.

2
Improvisation offers an understanding of self and other through the analysis of
interactions in music between one improviser and their audience, one improviser and the other
improviser(s), and one improviser and their own self. Improvisation allows for the self to be fully
reflexive and reflective, as well as reactive and acknowledging of the other in the space with
them. The self and the other are constituted by the assumption that there is some sort of mutual
acknowledgement taking place between the self and other. If there were not, then the
improvisation would not work.
Through close reading of the introduction to Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of
Perception, Tracy McMullen’s essay “The Improvisative,” and Gary Peters’s Philosophy of
Improvisation, I intend to address what formulates the relationship between the Self and the
Other in improvisation. Using two case studies, that of “Rejoinder” performed by Ikue Mori and
Julianna Barwick, and a live recording of John Coltrane performing “Afro-Blue” at Birdland in
1963, I hope to explore what constitutes the relationship and mutual acknowledgement between
self and other in improvised music.
In Section 1, I will explore Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s offering in the Preface to
Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty offers an understanding of the self as
consciousness that is reliant on a form of self-actualization and realization in order to constitute
the self. This understanding is supported by Merleau-Ponty’s examples of self-reflection, the
interaction between two selves, and a view of the self as fact in order to form an understanding
of consciousness as individual, existing for itself. Paul and Pierre are introduced as two distinct
consciousnesses who exist in the same space for themselves, and by the fact that they both exist
in this space, can acknowledge each other as individual consciousnesses, selves and others. With
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a detailed analysis of self-reflection as a means by which the individual consciousness can
understand its existence, we begin to shed light on how the solo improviser exists as both self
and other.
Tracy McMullen’s essay “The Improvisative” offers an understanding of the relationship
between self and other as performative and desiring. Though I argue against this notion using
Merleau-Ponty’s establishment of the self and other as mutually acknowledging, she puts for the
idea of the improvisative, offering a space that exists within itself. The improviser exists within
the improvisative, within a specific type of time known as the here and now, and allows for us to
understand improvisation as a specific space for the self and other to not just acknowledge each
other, but to also interact.
In Section 3, I use the work of John Coltrane, Ikue Mori, and Julianna Barwick as a mode
of understanding different improvisative spaces. Using Philosophy of Improvisation by Gary
Peters, I will build an understanding of the improviser as existing within their own work. This, in
tandem with Merleau-Ponty and McMullen, allows for an understanding of the relationship
between self and other as existing within itself, deepening the importance of the improvisative
space. Barwick and Mori’s piece, “Rejoinder,” allows for us to view the relationship between
improviser and improviser as self and other. This piece, recorded with the two along with an
engineer and film maker present, allows for a focused-in look at how two improvisers interact,
and offers an understanding and clear view of their acknowledgement of each other. Coltrane and
his band, recorded live at Birdland in 1963 offers two understandings of the relationship between
self and other - that of the improviser and his band, and that of the improviser and the audience.
Both these show mutual support and recognition, pushing the self to perform to the best of their
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abilities while still offering some grounding to the other, and the other offering grounding to the
self. The knowledge that this band has learned how to play with each other and that their work
extends beyond this one moment in time reveals the symbiotic relationship that the self and other
form in improvisation. The relationship between performer and audience reveals a new
understanding of McMullen’s work, expounding upon performativity and pressure (or, as
revealed, lack thereof) to be acknowledged. I hope to provide an understanding of the self and
other relationship through an exploration of improvisation, instances of finding home in the
improvisative, and a musician’s existence within their work.

5
1
A phenomenology, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, is a “study of
experience, or consciousness…Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced by
the subject or first person point of view.” 1 Phenomenological philosophy offers an understanding
of how the consciousness experiences the world, specifically the external world, though all the
while keeping the consciousness within itself. Phenomenology works inside the space of
consciousness, working to reveal how to self experiences the external. Phenomenology is
normally comprised by a study of sensory experiences, objects, the self, and others. Maurice
Merleau-Ponty uses the introduction of his book, Phenomenology of Perception, to establish a
definition of what a phenomenology is with relation to self-consciousness, the external world and
perception of the external world, and experience of the Other. It is important to note here that
Merleau-Ponty did quite a bit of work in the arts. In fact, in the end of the preface to
Phenomenology of Perception, he claims
“Phenomenology is as painstaking as the works of Balzac, Proust, Valéry, or Cézanne—
through the same kind of attention and wonder, the same demand for awareness, the same
will to grasp the sense of the world or of history in its nascent state.” 2(PP, 22/lxxxv)
Here we can understand that Merleau-Ponty believes art - as the names he mentions all worked
in written and visual art - perform similar work to the philosopher through their awareness and
the temporality of the work they produce. Interestingly, for the sake of this project, Merleau-
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Smith, David Woodruff. “Phenomenology.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford
University, 16 Dec. 2013, plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, trans. Donald A. Landes. Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge,
2014
2
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Ponty never studied music, philosophically, phenomenologically, or otherwise. I hope in this
project to use Merleau-Ponty’s Preface to Phenomenology of Perception as a means to
understanding the relationship between self and other, internal and external, in improvised music.
Using Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach will not only allow for a first-person (Self,
rather) perspective on improvised music, but allow for a greater internal understanding of the act
of improvisation.
Phenomenology is the study of essences, placing them “back within existence,” an
“attempt to provide a direct description of our experience such as it is, and without …the causal
explanations…Phenomenology allows itself to be practiced and recognized as a manner or as a
style, or that it exists as a movement,” its unity found with “its true sense in ourselves” (PP, lxx).
However, phenomenology “places essences back within existence and thinks that the only way to
understand man and the world is by beginning from their ‘facticity’” (PP, lxx). Merleau-Ponty
claims that we are “not the result or the intertwining of multiple causalities that determine [our]
body…or psyche.” We are not a “simple object,” but a full consciousness and “absolute” source
of our own experience (PP, 8/lxxi). Improvisation is not one by which the self is fully separated
from the world, but rather is the true interaction between the world and one’s self. We can be
fully cognizant of an understanding of the self as separate from the world.
Phenomenology offers an understanding of the corporeal self that exists for itself, within
itself. To understand “man and the world” by beginning from their facticity is to believe that the
Other exists in the world by the fact that the Self exists in the world. Facticity is an
understanding of truth, a truth that allows for the existence of an other external and separate from
the self. Phenomenology places consciousness within the world and in conversation with the
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Other. By positing consciousness as both outside and inside the corporeal, and as the sole source
of the existence of its own consciousness, we can understand that Phenomenology works to
engage one’s consciousness with the external, bringing the self outside the self while focusing on
what constitutes one’s own consciousness.
To understand what is meant by “unifying” we must dig through Merleau-Ponty’s claim
that first experiencing oneself revealing consciousness is the basis for unifying. Further,
consciousness, as unification, posits the world as its spectacle. Consciousness, as I have
established, is internal and does not require direct acknowledgement from an()other in order to
exist, but requires an internal understanding of its existence in order to exist. If one must
acknowledge their own consciousness, no matter how unconscious this acknowledgement is, in
order for their consciousness to be existent, then certainly the world must be acknowledged in
order to exist. I mean this to say that because acknowledgement of oneself must come from the
internal self, acknowledgement of the external must also stem from this same place. Looking
back to the Pierre/Paul example, Merleau-Ponty points out that there is no ‘conscious’ (meaning
thought through) acknowledgement of the other. Pierre does not have to think through
acknowledging Paul as an individual consciousness — he just does, and this comes from Paul’s
internalized recognition of his consciousness. However, this acknowledgement only occurs if and
by the fact that there is an external world that they both acknowledge. If they both have
experience in this external world, perhaps not the same experience but have lived in the same
world, then they can understand each other’s consciousness because of this somewhat shared
experience. From here, if these two consciousnesses can acknowledge that there is a shared
experience of an external world between them, then the external world must exist and be

8
acknowledged in the same way that the two acknowledge each other’s consciousnesses — a
mutually dependent triangulation. Further, I would like to say that I have established that there is
a shared acknowledgement here, plain to see, between how the two are acknowledged — as
consciousness, as the world. These acknowledgements come in tandem, and can thus be
understood as the same steps taken to acknowledge one as the proposed Other. Finally, unity is
found here through this dual acknowledgement of the world and the consciousness, thus
providing an understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s point that “the unity of consciousness is
precisely contemporary with the unity of the word” (PP, 12/lxxv).
Reflective analysis, the process by which the self recognizes the self, is a step toward
understanding and connecting one’s own experiences into a cohesive understanding of their
existence. Merleau-Ponty offers reflective analysis as “ceas[ing] to adhere to our experience and
substitute[s] a reconstruction for a description” (PP, 10/lxxiii). Reflection places itself “within an
invulnerable subjectivity,” and cannot be “unaware of itself as an event” (PP, 10/lxxiii). MerleauPonty suggests that reflective analysis “works back toward the subject as if toward a condition of
possibility distinct from our experience,” presenting “universal synthesis as that without which
there would be no world” (PP, 10/lxxiii) Looking back at the ‘unification’ of consciousness and
the world, reflective analysis can here be viewed as an understanding of said unification.
Because reflective analysis is separate, or distinct, from our experience, it offers an objective
way of looking at the relationship between consciousness and the world without a need for overanalysis. Perhaps most importantly, reflective analysis moves in the reverse direction with regard
to “a previous constitution and meets up with…a constituting power that it itself has always
been” (PP, 10/lxxiii) Reflecting upon what Merleau-Ponty has already claimed, I understand this
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as a way of understanding our consciousness’s own existence, as something we do not readily
acknowledge. However, as laid out in the Paul/Pierre example, one consciousness acknowledges
another without regard for a conscious acknowledgement of said ‘other’. In fact, we
acknowledge other consciousnesses, outside of our own, as existing because they exist in the
same world as ours does. Further, reflective analysis may not at all be necessary if we are to take
Merleau-Ponty’s claim that our consciousness exists by the fact that it is the “absolute source” of
its own existence. If this is the case, I do not think we need analyze our existence through any
means, but accept our existence, as our consciousness seems to have already done so. Accepting
subjectivity as a level of self-recognition, we can understand reflection as a way of viewing
oneself without outside threat — the invulnerable subjectivity. Looking at oneself in a mirror, we
are vastly aware of our own existence. This reflection in the case of the invulnerable subjectivity
is a way by which we can acknowledge our existence, our selfhood, as a stand-alone
acknowledgement.
However, perhaps there is some necessity for reflective analysis, though it may not be as
conscious as Merleau-Ponty sees to imply. Improvising music as a solo musician, in a room with
only oneself, is a way by which we can access this invulnerable subjectivity. For the solo
musician to improvise, they must be vigilantly aware of their own presence, their own
production, and able to react to the self. Reflection, here, is noticed through listening back,
listening closely to the self and what the self has produced. Reflective analysis, if understood as
connecting one’s experiences in order to cohesively understand their experience, is a necessary
step in the solo improviser’s process. With nothing to respond to but the sounds they have
produced, the solo musician is forced into reflective analysis through the act of listening. In this,
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they must react to themselves, understanding that what they are producing in a solo environment
is a reflection of their own consciousness. If, for example, the solo improviser is using a
technique such as looping or a program that replays what they have just played, they have a
literal reflection of their sound to respond to. This loop, though a transmutation of a sound they
have just played into the digital sphere, is similar to that which we see in a mirror. When we look
in a mirror, we are not seeing our exact self but a reflection of our self. In the same way, a loop is
not exactly what we have just played but a mirrored reproduction of what we have just created.
This also serves as a divergence from the mirror. In the case of the improviser, we must react in
some way to this reflection of our sound. While reaction to what we see in the mirror may be
more passive, reaction to the reflection of our sound is inherently active, as we are reacting in
such a way that implies there will be another reaction soon following.
Reflection appears as a “genuine creation,” a change in the structure of consciousness,
and yet “involves recognizing, prior to its own operations, the world that is given to the subject
because the subject is given to himself” (PP, 10/lxxiii) This “giving back” from the world to the
self to the self requires acknowledgement for it to take place. The idea of giving back and
subsequent acknowledgement and seeing of a genuine creation constitutes selfhood in that the
self recognizes that what they are seeing, what they are, is their self, their consciousness.
Further understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s means by “reflection through” suggests that
because reflection is always part of what it is reflecting, it has a situated and partial perspective.
This is to say that although reflection is in part an objective view of the self, reflection’s basis in
one’s own self. Their ability to gain understanding through reflection causes this reflection to be
biased toward the self. Because “everything [one] knows about [oneself]” is know through “a
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perspective that is [one’s] own or from an experience of the world,” the assumption is thus that
an individual’s understanding of the world comes from their own observations (PP, 9/lxxii). The
self here is constituted upon the assumption that an individual has experiences that influence
their understanding of the world. These experiences form the self, making them individual and a
self-referential self-consciousness. They are able to acknowledge that they have had experiences
in the world and that these experiences have made them into the person they are. To say this
causes individuality would only be scratching the surface — instead this allows for
acknowledgement of the other in a fair and understanding manner. This is not to say that
observation and reflection are not helpful for the understanding of the self, but rather that they
are, indeed, influenced by a person’s experience in the world. This is not to say that this closes
off the opportunity of connection from this bias. This bias, as stated above, is that the self’s
experiences are true and this truth constitutes this reality. Breaking this to understand that the self
functions both as a way of understanding the world and existence of the Other constitutes
acknowledgement. Merleau-Ponty suggests looking at an example of two individual
consciousnesses acknowledgement of one another in order to fully understand how the self and
other interact.
Merleau-Ponty brings up the example of Paul and Pierre as an example of a unity and
intersection of their individual consciousnesses. Paul and Pierre are introduced as two individual
consciousnesses whose mutual acknowledgement of one another is almost unthinking, accepting
each other’s existence as selves by the fact that they both have experiences in the same world.
The Paul/Pierre example offers much for the understanding of self and other, and I will return to
this as a point of reference throughout this project.

12
As we have established, the self understand’s the world through their own experiences,
and recognizes that there is an external world. The “perception of the world ‘by Paul’” is not his
own doing, but the work of his consciousness, a “pre-personal consciousness” performing the act
of perception, or as I claimed, the work of the self. Bringing in Pierre as the self, we can
elucidate the self/other relationship (PP, 12/lxxv). Paul’s consciousness is viewed, by Pierre as a
pre-personal consciousness that engages with the same shared world as Pierre, thus allowing the
two to not only communicate, but acknowledge each other’s individual consciousnesses. By the
fact that Pierre acknowledges Paul’s consciousness, Paul, in turn, acknowledges Pierre’s
consciousness. Merleau-Ponty here lays out the fact that because the two individual
consciousnesses share experience of the same world world in which they live, they are able to
connect on that fact and communicate with each other. However, Merleau-Ponty claims that
insofar as Pierre is conscious and has a sense for himself, there is no need to distinguish himself
from “another” consciousness. Sensibility is where past experiences inform present knowledge
and experience, as explained by Merleau-Ponty through an analysis of how an individual
understand the color red.
“…my sensation of red is apperceived as a manifestation of a certain sensed red, which
is in turn sensed as a manifestation of a red surface, which is in turn sensed as the
manifestation of a red box, which is, in the end, sensed as a manifestation or as a profile
of a red thing, namely, this book. Thus, this would be the apprehensive of a certain hylè
[matter] as signifying a phenomenon of a higher degree, the Sinn-gebung [sense-giving],
the active signifying operation that might be the definition of consciousness, and the
world would be nothing other than the “significaiton: world.” (PP, 11/lxxv)
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A sensation is an understanding of what something appears to be, a manifestation of what it is in
its entirety. There is a matter that signifies that the definition of a consciousness existing outside
of the internal consciousness, the external that is the product of sensation. This sensation,
however, is not the basis for what comprises the self, but instead is what makes up the Other, the
external world. If we did not have such sensations or sense-giving, we would not be aware of the
external, and thus not be aware of the Other or the external world. Here Merleau-Ponty offers the
idea that the individual will incorporate past experience into their understanding of the world.
These past experiences inflect upon present experience and are unique for the individual, because
the individual is the only one to have had these specific experiences in the world. Because of
these unique experiences, the individual consciousness does not need to distinguish itself from
other consciousnesses because these sensory experiences make up their own consciousness. I
will later explore this in relation to improvisatory practice, but here it is clear that the individual
is individual in part by his unique sensory experiences in the world.
Everyone who is conscious is an immediate presence in the world by the fact that the
world is a “system of truths,” we share an experience of the world and use this as a matter of
truth (PP, 12/lxxv). If the world is a system of truths, then those who exist in the world are true
beings with experiences that are true. Thus, the existence of the other in a world that is a system
of truths cannot be denied existence.
Merleau Ponty asserts:
“Reflective analysis is unaware of the problem of others [autrui], just as it is
unaware of the problem of the world, because from the first flicker of
consicousness it grants me the power to go toward a truth that is universal by
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right, and since the other is himself without [thisness], without place, and
without a body, the [self and other] are one and the same in the true world,
which is the unifier of minds. There is no difficulty in understanding how ‘I’ can
think the Other [l’Autrui] because the ‘I’ and consequently the Other [l’Autre]
are not trapped in the fabric of phenomena and have a value rather than an
existence.” (PP, 12/lxxv)
Reflective analysis is here understood as purely within the self. Because it is “unaware of the
problem of others … unaware of the problem of the world” and is based purely in consciousness,
functioning to draw the individual self closer to truth, we can understand it as existing in each
individual but only for the purpose of understanding the individual self’s consciousness (PP, 12/
lxxv). The outcome of this as we have established is an understanding that each Other has an
individual consciousness. The other is a not a ‘problem’ to understand, but rather an undeniable
existing consciousness that exists for its own sake, rather than for the sake of the individual self.
Reflective analysis, and thus the self, is not concerned with why the other exists, instead simply
taking its existence as fact and going forward from there. The Other, here, is presented as equal
to the ‘I’ - the self - because they have the same form of being - a being based in value, a being
not trapped by “phenomena.” The acknowledgment of the other by the self, and the self by the
other, comes through the self’s ability to acknowledge similarities between the two.
Merleau-Ponty has established the self/other relationship as self-realization and
actualization that places the self and the other on even ground, based in the fact that they both
have value or, as I would like to say, something to offer. The self is brought about through one’s
own acknowledgement of their existence, and the spectacle of the world. The self recognizes that
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there is an external world in which they move, and that this is cause for their existence. The self,
then, is conscious and has a consciousness that stems from the internal acknowledgement that
one does, indeed, exist. This type of acknowledgement is brought about by self-reflection and
reflective analysis that not only offers the ability for one to understand their experiences in the
world, but also to recognize themselves—a deeper understanding of their selfhood. In tandem
with this, Merleau-Ponty brings about the Paul/Pierre example as a means of expressing how the
self/other relationship functions. Paul and Pierre acknowledge each other as self and other by the
fact that they both, individually, have had experiences in the same world. These experiences
constitute the self, and constitute the acknowledgment of the other. Contrary to other
understandings of the self/other relationship, Merleau-Ponty places the self and other on a level
playing field that understands the differences between the two (individual consciousnesses) while
also acknowledging that there is the ability for the two to connect and interact in a fair way. The
‘I’ (self) recognizes the Other as not merely existing within phenomena, but having a value,
something to offer the ‘I’, and the Other as its own ‘I’ understands the same the other way
around.
Merleau-Ponty suggests that the self is brought into being by and for the self. “I am the
one who brings myself into being…I am the absolute source [of] certainty of myself for
myself” (PP, 9/lxxii) This is not to say that there is no need for the other, but the first
acknowledgement of the self must come from the self. As suggested in the text, Descartes and
Kant “freed the subject or consciousness by establishing that I could not grasp anything as
existing if I did not first experience myself as existing in the act of grasping…consciousness [is]
the absolute certainty of myself for myself” (PP, 9/lxxii). To unpack this, we can understand that
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there is a level of grasping that occurs when the self is trying to acknowledge the self as an
individual consciousness. The “grasping” here, illuminated by the claim that “I could not grasp
anything as existing…” gives light to the idea that there is a level to which there is a perpetual
struggle between the consciousness and the external world. Grasping here is not grasping at
straws. The consciousness must engage in the act of grasping as a way of staying in touch with
one’s own consciousness. To understand this, we must look back to the idea that one must
experience grasping in order to have absolute certainty “of myself for myself” (PP, 9/lxxii). As
explored through the Pierre/Paul example, there is no active or conscious decision to
acknowledge another consciousness insofar as the two exist in and have the same experience of
the world. Grasping, then, is not an active choice, for grasping here is the active attempt at
recognizing consciousness. As stated above, if we do not first grasp, we cannot understand the
external. Our first experience of grasping must be from within, grasping at and grappling with
our own consciousness and understanding of self. This grasping leaves way for a smoother
acknowledgement of the external, an act that requires little effort and allows for the self to
simply acknowledge the other. Grasping is the struggle for selfhood that in turn resolves an
individual’s conception of their self. Understanding that Paul and Pierre do not have to actively
work to acknowledge each other’s selfhood and consciousness give truth to the fact that our own
consciousness’s grasping gives way for acknowledgement of consciousness.
Here, we can understand that the act of understanding the self as an individual
consciousness is not an active choice, but instead an internalized individual understanding. As
previously stated by Merleau-Ponty, “the absolute certainty of myself for myself” allows for an
understanding of the external world. However, from here Merleau-Ponty suggests that this
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“unifying” is nothing “without the spectacle of the world that it unites”. What does this say about
what we have established with regard to the (lack of) need of personal conscious
acknowledgement? I propose that this spectacle, put forth by Merleau-Ponty, is an act of
performativity. However, from my reading and understanding, what Merleau-Ponty is claiming
about the understanding of self is non-performative. I posit that self acknowledgement, as well as
acknowledgement of other, is non-performative, but rather passive and not a matter of conscious
deliberation.
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2
Tracy McMullen claims that “musical improvisation may offer insights into a conception
of self and other different from the dominant model found in most cultural theory.”3 In order to
unpack this, one must address the self / other relationship and define it in the context of cultural
theory. McMullen asks if there is an understanding of the self through “a radical and constitutive
relation to alterity”, here alterity being understood as otherness (TI, 116). McMullen explains the
self/other relationship with respect to Hegel’s “Lordship and Bondage,” claiming we must
conceive of self-consciousness as existing “in and for itself when and by the fact that it so exists
for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (TI, 117). With this Hegel and
McMullen claim that the recognized becomes the recognizer, and the acknowledged becomes the
acknowledger. This understanding of the relationship between Self and Other is not that
established in Section 1; this understanding is more one sided, implying reliance on the other to
manifest the self. Self-consciousness is predicated on the fact that there is another self (an other)
there to acknowledge your own selfhood. Similar to what Merleau-Ponty claimed, the self
acknowledges the existence of the self by the mere fact that it is conscious and has experiences
in the world, externally.
McMullen uses Butler to explain the concept of selfhood with regard to dependence, as
opposed to independence.

McMullen, Tracy. “The Improvisative.” The Oxford Handbook of Critical Improvisation
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3

19
“One comes to ‘exist by virtue of [the] fundamental dependency on the address of the
Other. One ‘exists’ not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in a prior sense by being
recognizable” (TI, 117).
This seems in contrast to what we have understood Merleau-Ponty claim to be in
Phenomenology of Perception. Not only did he establish the self as self-actualizing, but the self
and other as recognizing each other through a fluid understanding that they both have
experiences in the world, by that fact they both exist as individual selves. McMullen’s offering of
understanding the relationship between self and other does not stand with the relationships
within improvised music. The self does not depend upon the other in order to exist, but instead is
self-reliant. As explained in the previous section, the self’s ability to recognize its own existence
through corporeal form and a grasping, a struggle to acknowledge the Self’s consciousness,
allows for the existence of the self. Further, self-consciousness is the self’s acknowledgement of
its existence, notwithstanding acknowledgement from the other. However, this does bring up an
interesting point about desire and performativity within the existence of the self.
McMullen uses Butler to introduce the idea of the subject as a desiring thing. There is a
level of this suggested self/other relationship that implies desire - desire is for acknowledgement,
recognition of the individual self from the other. Here, the desiring self hopes for an
acknowledgement from outside, creating a “struggle for recognition” (TI, 117). From my own
understanding and working through of the text, it comes across that this desire complicates
selfhood. This desire does not allow for recognition of the self in its clearest form, but instead
requires the recognition of self through the acknowledgement of an other. With the introduction
of desire, the self/other relationship is “constituted and delimited” through the need for
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recognition (TI, 117). The self and other only exist in the ‘larger cultural order’ because of a need
for external validation and recognition. The self/other relationship is hereby delineated to a self
that exists through the view of an other, external self-consciousness. McMullen explains from
here Butler’s claim that there is, in essence, a lack of “freedom” and instead a “concrete
determination and expression” through the existence of the self through the lens of a larger
cultural order (TI, 117).
Though this understanding of the self/other relationship adds a level of externality to the
self’s ability to recognize itself as an individual being, I do not uphold that this desire is what
necessarily constitutes the existence of the self. As stated above, this desire brings about a level
of performativity which neither confirms nor denies the existence of a self. If we take MerleauPonty’s claim as true, as I have written before, the self exists by its acknowledgment of its own
existence. There are no bells and whistles in this type of acknowledgement, but the
performativity of the self/other relationship comes into play when desire is introduced. If we
seek external acknowledgement of our existence, we are put into a space in which we can be
viewed as an individual. Interaction, then, is deemed performative if the self is seeking this
external acknowledgement. If we take this as fact, how does this play into McMullen’s
understanding of the relationship with in improvisation?
Musical improvisation is not merely performative, but a deep exploration of the self
through musical practice. Tracy McMullen introduces the idea of the “improvisative” in
conversation with, not in opposition to, improvisation. The word improvisative offers a different
understanding of performativity through her pre-established self/other relationship regarding a
desire for acknowledgement from the other. Improvisation can be understood as the actual act of
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improvising, playing music in a free way, on the fly. McMullen claims that ‘improvisative’ offers
an understanding “not based on recognition or intelligibility…point[ing] toward a space where
the separation between observer and thing or actor and action is not meaningful” (TI, 118). Here,
McMullen offers an understanding of how the self/other relationship is presented through the
improvisative in the terms of “observer and thing” and “actor and action”. However, we read that
she claims these separations are not meaningful in the space of the improvisative, but this offers
an understanding of relationships established in improvsative spaces that present a self/other
relationship to be unpacked (TI, 118). As I will touch on, I do not believe that the self/other
relationship is not meaningful in improvsative practice, but rather an important relationship that
levels some sort of hypothetical playing ground between self and other, and clarifies recognition
between the two (or singular) entitie(s).
McMullen proposes the improvisative as a challenge to “intelligibility, thinkability,
recognition, and desire” (TI, 118). As understood in the context of this essay, the intelligibility
proposed here is repeatability. As McMullen wrote on Butler, “language needs to be repeated in
order to be legible,” but the improvisative challenges this notion (TI, 116). McMullen proposes
that the improvisative, essentially, need not be repeatable, need not be legible. McMullen instead
suggests that the improvisative is not based in what is thinkable, challenging “forms of knowing
based on conceptual thought” (TI, 118). Perhaps the most applicable takeaway from McMullen’s
proposition is that, within the improvisative, there is a “lean toward the subject rather than a
prevailing lean toward the object” (TI, 118). Her use of the word lean here does not mean that
there is one way that the relationship between the subject and object nor self and other — in fact,
the two are not separate.
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In the improvisative, there is a focus on what the ‘self’ can do in situations of
improvisation. However, given the nature of improvisation that I hope to shed light on, there is
no difference between the self and other, nor subject and object. Instead, as discussed in my
unpacking of Merleau-Ponty, the two are symbiotic in the sense that they coexist in the same
world, and sharing in this experience of the world, acknowledge each other. The same is true for
McMullen’s proposed understanding of the improvisative.
“The improvisative is not based on recognition or intelligibility. It is not concerned with
the realm of what is ‘thinkable’; indeed, it challenges forms of knowing based on
conceptual thought. It is not historical, although it offers a relationship to the past,
present, and future. What I believe may be the most important in a theorization of the
improvisative is its lean toward the subject rather than a prevailing toward the object. As
I hope I will make clear, I say ‘lean’ because, while the emphasis with the improvisative
may be on what the ‘self’ can do, in the final analysis the self and the other are not
separate…the improvisative may best be related to the idea of singularity and a type of
knowing that is non-conceptual.” (TI, 118)
The improvisative, thus, can be understood as a space in time that exists only for itself, outside of
worldly understanding or, as McMullen claimed at the beginning of her essay, outside of cultural
theory. The improvisative offers itself as an option, a space, rather than a specific action or
decision. The improvisative functions in such a way that allows for the improviser to find
reflexivity, self-reflection and a meeting of self and other. In the next section of this project I will
explore specific examples of the improvisative, but for now, we must build an understanding of
how the self and other function in the improvisative space.
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McMullen claims that within the improvisative, there is a lean toward the subject, though
in the end, the self and other are not separate. However, McMullen’s explanation of this is that
there is unity of self and other “because they are equally phantasmagorical” (TI, 118). I do not
take this at face value, as I believe the self/other relationship within the improvisative to be based
upon a functional relationship of equal recognition as opposed to their hard-to-grasp existence.
Using Merleau-Ponty we can understand that the self and other recognize each other without
needing to struggle to do so, this in opposition to the proposed idea that the self and other are
constantly desiring recognition from the other. The word “lean” is used to signal to the fact that
the “focus [is] on what the ‘self’ can do” (TI, 118). Because the self is the improviser, or
specified improviser in a group improvisation setting, the focus is on what they are
accomplishing and what decisions they are making in that moment. This “lean” then points
toward self-acknowledgement, that which Merleau-Ponty put forth in Phenomenology of
Perception. Gary Peters offers that in improvisation, the improviser is entirely “inside” their
work, without the chance to function as an observer of their work. This serves the improviser
because in this case what is created is entirely from the self, the improviser. Their existence in
the improvisative space is not completely internal, however, as the improviser offers themselves
to the Other in a proposed improvisation. The self here is both inside and outside of their internal
consciousness. Focusing in on what they are playing while also being able to respond to and play
against what another improviser offers them. An improviser gives melody or rhythm or harmony
for the other, and the other provides the same for the self. The self in the improvisative also
offers recognition and acknowledgement to the other. The self recognizes that the other is
observing them and reacting to them through the improvisative space. This not only forces the
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self to reflect upon what they are doing as an improviser, but also reflect upon and react to what
the other is doing in this space. Thus, the self is both recognizing themselves and the other in this
space, both as valid actors in the improvisative, and actors that can offer up some good to the
improviser.
Instead of there being a stark contrast or division between the self and other, the two
meet in the space of the improvisative and function, acknowledging the other’s presence. This
relationship is possible because of the “here and now” (TI, 119). McMullen writes that “the
improvisative can be understood as a singular moment, a moment in the ‘here and now’ that
remains open and in which one does not cohere into the decision” (TI, 119). Decision and the
here and now come hand in hand, as McMullen explains that brings “both subject and object into
being” (TI, 119). But how is this possible? It seems that her writing earlier and refutation of
‘desire’ would imply that ‘deciding’ would fall more in line with desiring acknowledgement than
creating it, as “deciding or anticipating brings both subject and object into being” (TI, 119).
McMullen puts forth that the “improvisative is abiding without deciding or anticipating”, as we
have established it is not based in repetition nor iterability (TI, 119). It exists in the here and now,
one singular moment outside of the “Other of language” (TI, 119). However, I understand
‘decision’ to be the spontaneity of momentary pause, allowing for an individual to make a
decision in the foretold “here and now” in order to have an interaction with another
consciousness.
Though I do agree with most of McMullen’s definition of the improvisative, I believe the
relationship between self and other to be somewhat different. Though McMullen claims that “the
self and other are not separate (because they are equally phantasmagorical),” I do not believe
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their being “phantasmagorical” is the cause of their unity (TI, 118). Rather, I propose that the self
and other here are not separate because of what Merleau-Ponty establishes in Phenomenology of
Perception. Rather than their phantasmagoria being the cause of the self/other unity in the
improvisative, it is the fact that both self and other have value and exist within the same world
that causes their unity. Further, the self and other’s ability to acknowledge and interact with one
another is the reason for their unity. In the improvisative, a space outside thinkability and and
intelligibility, allows for the full connection between the self and other to move beyond regular
recognition into a space of trade and acknowledgement. In the improvisative, the “lean toward
the subject” that McMullen suggests does suggest an interesting understanding of the self/other
relationship. As she suggested (and I refuted) earlier on, the self relies on the other for
recognition. However, using Merleau-Ponty I established that the self and other have an equal
relationship that allows for their recognition to be equal by the fact that they both exist and have
experiences in the world. However, give the state of the improvisative, there is a level to which
the lean toward the self comes from the fact that the improvisative allows itself to be a space for
self-reflection and reflective analysis. Here, this ‘lean’ is purely predicated upon the self’s own
reflexivity, rather than a focus on the self. In the improvisative, as I will explore through a case
study in the next section, the individual self reflects upon themselves, and reacts to the other
improvisers or observers present.
However, the self’s focus is on the self, no matter how involved with the other it is. There
is a level to which the self’s involvement with the other is based in their internal relations. As
explained by Merleau-Ponty through the Paul/Pierre example, the self and other interact because
of their shared experience of the world. The self is predicated on an internal relationship, and the
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relationship to other is brought about by an externalization of this relationship. Thus, the lean
toward the self is due to the fact that the self’s first relationship is internal. A relationship with
the other is only made possible by the self’s externalization of this relationship. If there is a lean
toward the subject in the improvisative, it is not due to unequal acknowledgment or desire, but
rather the self’s own recognition of the self, their reflection and reflective analysis, rather than a
need for validation by the other.
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With an understanding of what the self/other relationship looks like in, as McMullen
called it, standard philosophy, I would like now to establish the self/other relationship within an
improvised music setting. For this purpose, I will be using both the term ‘improvisative’ and
‘improvisation’ in order to signify two different understandings of what it means for a musician
to improvise. In this case, ‘improvisative’ will signify a specific moment of improvisation in
which the self/other relationship is most readily accessible through an understanding of the
musician’s existence in a space outside time, within only music, a singular moment in which the
improvisation comes to being. ‘Improvisation’ will signify the actual act of improvising in a
closed or open setting, meaning for an audience or for oneself. Here, I will look at an example of
improvisation, that of Coltrane’s solo in “Afro Blue” on the record Live at Birdland, as well as
“Rejoinder” performed by Ikue Mori and Julianna Barwick. Using Gary Peters’s writing on the
philosophy of improvisation, our established understanding of the self/other relationship, and
these examples of improvisation in (recorded) real-time, I will establish an understanding of how
this relationship presents itself and how it is navigated by those involved.
In Chapter 3 of The Philosophy of Improvisation, Gary Peters asks if there is a “failing”
in the nature of improvisation because “the improviser is inside rather than outside the situation”4
(PI, 112). By claiming the improviser is inside the situation is to say that the improviser,
necessarily situated within the improvisative, only exists within that one momentary action of
improvisation, rather than also existing outside it, as, say, a composer exists outside their work.
Improvisation is by nature involved and not planned out. Composition occurs when a composer
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writes out specific notes, levels of volume (dynamics), and articulations. Improvisers, on the
other hand, work in such a way that what they ‘write’ happens in real time as they are
performing. Improvisation is often used in jazz, the improvisation happening after the main
melody and over the chord changes of the piece. Free improvisation is when one or a few
improvisers participate in active listening and active creation, essentially composing a piece in
real time with each other, and using the strength of those they are performing with to uphold
their voice.
This situation allows for the improviser remain continuously inside that work as the core
creator, though without the option of listening as an outsider unless listening to what another
improviser is playing. An improvisers cannot distance themselves from their work, and thus
cannot view what they are creating in real time in the same way that a non-improvising art
practitioner can. Peters claims, using Niklas Luhmann, that “where self-observation is always
already filtered through the observation of the other,” the work “becomes intelligible only when
one takes into account that they are produced for the sake of observation” (PI, 112) Here, we are
presented with a sense that the self is found within the improviser, and the other is only found
through the observer. However, thinking back to McMullen’s claim that the improvisative is not
intelligible, there is some discord found between these two claims.
Peters asks:
“What reflective insight does [the ability to step outside of work] that is not available to
the performer? While the dancer cannot physically be in two places at once and thus may
not see the whole performance there is no reason to believe that an improvisor cannot
enter into what Niklas Luhmann describes as a ‘second order observation’ where self-
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observation is always already filtered through the observation of the other, thus
embedding in the work what Luhmann called the ‘observational directives to be
followed by the observer of that work” (PI, 112)
Self-observation here allows for the improvisor to be both inside and outside of their work,
inside and outside of their performance. The ability for the self to be able to self-reflect while in
the act of creating allows for a self-reflective exploration of their improvisation. Similarly, as I
will explain with the two examples, the present Other - in the case of improvisation either a
fellow improviser or the audience - allows for the improviser to in a sense get feedback in real
time. In this case, the Other will respond through sound to the improviser’s creation, playing
back quotations of what they just played, or providing a rhythmic or chordal response to the
improviser. As established by Merleau-Ponty, sensory experience plays a part in the development
of individual and unique consciousness. In this sense, the improviser has their own
understanding of what they are producing, and thus their sound is unique and specific to their
past experiences with music. Their interactions with the Other, then, is influenced and predicated
upon the understanding that this other improviser has their own experiences and unique,
individual consciousness. Like the experience and associations with red mentioned in the first
section, the same is applicable to music through the processes and unique training in music.
On the one hand, the observer or audience may find a work to be ‘intelligible’ in the
sense that it is consumable. This consumption is present through their viewing of the improvised
work and internalizing of the product produced by the ‘self,’ the improviser. Can we take this
relationship at face value? Given what Merleau-Ponty suggests in the Pierre/Paul example, I do
not think it is that simple. As established, Pierre and Paul acknowledge each other’s
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consciousnesses for and by the fact that they both exist in the same world, and because they both
have experience in the same world, they do not need to consciously acknowledge one and the
other’s existence. The self/other relationship here is passive and almost unthinking, with mutual
acknowledgement. Instead of being presented as an uneven relationship, Merleau-Ponty suggests
with the Pierre/Paul example that there is an equality between self and other. What Peters seems
to be suggesting, however, is that the self, the improviser, must produce something for the sake
of observation in order for the other, the observer, to understand or consume it. Though
inherently art is made to be consumable by the viewer, observer, or listener, I do not think that
the self/other relationship in improvised music is predicated upon the consumability or
intelligibility of an improvised work.
As McMullen established in her essay “The Improvisative,” the improvisative exists in a
space outside understanding and legibility, but as I established, this is not entirely true in the
translation to the ‘other’ in the improvisative self/other relationship. Though there is a distinct
unknowingness from the improviser’s end, the observer or fellow improviser, the other, uses the
improviser, the self’s, action as motive for reaction. (I would like to note here that ‘observer’ can
be understood as either viewer, audience, or fellow improvisor depending on the situation, but I
will return to this issue below.) The constant back and forth between improviser and observer
allows for our understanding of the Pierre/Paul example to translate over to the self/other
relationship in improvised music. In the same way that Paul and Pierre acknowledge each other
for the reasons that they do, the improviser and observer acknowledge each other. The
improviser accepts that they exist and are improvising by the fact that they are in the act of
improvising and that they have a consciousness (they are the “source” of their own existence). In
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the same way, the observer acknowledges that they are hearing the improviser in the
improvisative, and reacting to it through processing or, if the other here is another performer,
responding to the improviser. Looking back to Peters suggestion that an improviser exists
entirely within their own improvisative act, seems to be fitting, but I would like to note that the
other draws the self outside of the improvisation.
Peters suggests a “self-reflexivity” that exists within improvisation, a constant and
incessant need for the self to reflect upon their improvisative act in real time (PI, 112). MerleauPonty has established that reflective analysis exists as a way for one to look back upon oneself,
and pre-reflection a way for one to understand their own relationship to things outside of their
own self. Improvisation bridges the two for the improviser, forcing them into a state of reflection
and pre-reflection, looking toward their relationship within the decisions they are making in
improvisation, and forcing them into a state of pre-reflection to understand their relationship to
observer and/or fellow improviser. I say decision because, though McMullen may refute this
with her claim that the improvisative exists outside of decision, there is a level to which there is
still cognizant decision making happening in the here and now of the improvisative. There is a
level of reaction at play within the improvisative — it is not a standalone act within its own
existence, but a space of the here and now which allows for the improviser to exist within their
consciousness, and within the world. The improvisative act is that of pre-reflection and reflection
in tandem, offering interiority and exteriority to the self. Thus, the self/other relationship here is
based within acknowledgment of the other, as well as interaction with the other through the
decision of both parties to hear and react to what the other is doing.
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In the piece “Rejoinder” by Ikue Mori and Julianna Barwick, the two find improvisative
space within and around the other. Barwick improvises using vocals and a loop pedal, while
Mori uses electronics, specifically a program called max/MSP, to react, interact, and meld with
each other. Ikue Mori is an electronic musician who has worked with Bill Frisell among others,
and primarily works to create her own programs to accomplish the sounds that she wants to
create. Julianna Barwick is a trained vocalist who works using her voice as an ethereal tone,
rather than reciting lyrics. The piece begins with Mori’s altered, captured, and interactive sounds
swirling through the listener’s ear. Barwick enters with a singular rather short note, and the two
begin their play. Throughout the piece, both Mori and Barwick actively listen and respond to one
another. In footage of the live, improvised recording of “Rejoinder,” you can see the two of
them, though not actively looking at each other, reacting to the sound the other is putting out.
The two, seated facing each other at a table covered with their gear (a pedal, a computer), meet
in the improvisative space allowing for deeper collaboration in the singular moment. The album
FRKWYS Vol. 6 is a collection of their improvisations, immediately cut to four different pieces
after the improvisations completed.
“Rejoinder” allows for the real-time, less rehearsed version of the practice of
improvisation. I have found that it exemplifies, once again, the Paul/Pierre example from
Phenomenology of Perception, while also proving the active engagement inside an improvisation
that Peters points to in his text. “Rejoinder” was performed and recorded without an audience,
with only a cameraman and one can assume an audio engineer. Thus, the other here is specified
to the other improviser, and the broader listening audience. However, I believe that the fact they
are only improvising with and for each other, there is a level of mediation that further specifies
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this instance of the improvisative space. Without the ‘other’ of an audience, Mori and Barwick’s
freedom to utilize the otherness of each other in this space is exemplified. It would normally be
difficult to find balance between Barwick’s ethereal vocal loops and Mori’s more percussive
found sounds, but I argue, because of this specific instance of improvisation, balance is struck by
the fact that the two are only improvising with and for each other. Here, Peters and MerleauPonty’s ideas about reflection and reflexivity are easily observable as Barwick and Mori engage
in reflection, the response, and self-reflexivity, the active decision making of the improvisative
space. Though their sounds are at their core deeply different, Mori and Barwick still manage to
build reflections of the other through their individual processes. Mori’s sounds soften in the latter
half of the piece, a response to Barwick’s floating tones, and Barwick, in the first half of the
piece uses shorter more annunciated sounds to mimic Mori. There is a trade occurring throughout
the piece that exemplifies their acknowledgement of the other’s process and sound, a decision
that translates into a cohesive piece of music that exemplifies both Mori and Barwick’s distinct
sounds and voices.
John Coltrane is one of the best-known jazz musicians to have lived, revolutionizing the
genre by introducing modes of improvised jazz as well as extraordinarily demanding and
complicated chord changes that have challenged musicians since. Three tracks off John
Coltrane’s album Live at Birdland were recorded live at Birdland and, perhaps, the best example
of this performance is found in the track “Afro Blue.” Contrary to “Rejoinder,” “Afro Blue” was
recorded in front of an audience at a jazz club in New York City, whereas “Rejoinder” was
recorded in private, a conversation purely between two musicians. Live at Birdland features
Coltrane, McCoy Tyner, Jimmy Garrison, and Elvin Jones, building and disassembling
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conversations to the tune of Coltrane himself, and other jazz composers. “Afro Blue,” written by
Mongo Santamaria, features what I think is the best and purest example of a cohesive jazz
improvisation. Tyner and Coltrane effortlessly trade off melody and solo, rhythm and tune,
through the arc of the piece. What is different with “Afro Blue” from “Rejoinder” is not only the
fact that the improvisation occurs over a set series of chords, but the fact that it also takes place
in a public setting with an audience present, offering the other side of the self/other relationship
in improvised music. Here, we will take the self as Coltrane, and the other as both audience and
band.
In the instance of “Afro Blue,” Coltrane takes the second solo, following McCoy Tyner,
and brilliantly picks up where the pianist left off. The end of Tyner’s solo feels like a vamp,
playing chords with the same rhythmic components repeatedly through a crescendo that builds
up to Coltrane’s entrance. Coltrane enters with a slide up to a high note, not only directly
carrying the energy Tyner had built up through his solo, but translating this energy into his own
playing style, landing on the high not and falling into rapid note patters moving down the range
of the saxophone. Coltrane’s self seems to be acknowledging what Tyner has offered him, and
carrying that through into his solo. Similar to the self/other relationship found between Mori and
Barwick, Coltrane and Tyner, though taking different solos, sound as if they are in a
conversation, acknowledging the other’s musicianship.
Given the nature of the function of a band in jazz, and given the full history of Coltrane,
we know that he, Tyner, Garrison, and Jones had played together for a long time before this
performance at Birdland. Knowing this, we can assume that they not only know each other’s
playing styles, but they have learned the nuances and how each individual fits into the band,
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making a fully functional and cohesive unit. Assuming as much, there is probably less thought
going into fitting together as a group than there had been at the beginning of their collaborations.
Thus, during Coltrane’s solo, when Elvin Jones, the drummer, catches on to a specific rhythmic
moment that Coltrane establishes, the moment wows the audience but more than likely was
hardly any thought for the musicians themselves. Because the relationship between Coltrane and
his band members has been pre-established, the acknowledgement of the other and the self is less
of a stressor, but rather comes naturally for the band as a whole. Similar to what is heard in
“Rejoinder,” in “Afro Blue” there is constant acknowledgement of the other player’s style and
space noticeable, listening to how Coltrane plays off the lines, rhythms, and block chords the
other three provide him with through his solo.
As Gary Peters points out in his quotation from Luhmann, “the unique meaning of the
forms embedded in the work of art…becomes intelligible only when one takes into account that
they are produced for the sake of observation” (PI, 112). In the case of Live at Birdland and
“Afro Blue,” this was recorded at a live set for an audience, not mediated by a studio or the
artists being in a space not accessible to the audience or a space only found through listening
back. There were, in fact, observers present for the creation of this album, and the distinct
meaning of the album, the decision made by the musicians, and the interpretation of the artist’s
interpretation, is up for debate by the audience themselves. This presents a distinct self/other
relationship not present in “Rejoinder,” as I have mentioned before. This relationship instead
offers the audience a realtime understanding of the pieces performed, instead of the easy “listen
again” option of recorded music. In the same way, there is a specific type of performativity that
reveals itself in live recorded improvised music. In the case of Coltrane, in live performance, he
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has this one specific opportunity to perform for this one specific audience in this specific space at
this specific time. Whereas, perhaps similar to “Rejoinder,” improvisation can be re-recorded,
done over, and altered in a recording studio, the performance of improvised music in a live
setting allows for the self to reach full expression, or come short of the same, through the
decisions made in real time by the performer. The observer, the other, knows this as the
excitement of jazz seems to come from the one-time opportunity to see a piece performed live,
the one-time opportunity to see this specific performance that will perhaps never be heard again
(as is the nature of improvisation). In a similar fashion, this also offers the self, as we have
established in this case, Coltrane, the opportunity to be fully self-reflective in his interpretation
of the piece, and his decisions made in the here and now.
This Coltrane example also points to a deeper understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s
suggestion that the I recognizes other by the fact the two are not bounded by “phenomena,” but
rather have a “value.” The audience and other improvisers playing with Coltrane both have
something to offer to Coltrane, the self. As Merleau-Ponty says, “nothing is hidden behind these
faces or these gestures, and there are no landscapes that remain inaccessible to [oneself]” (PP,
12/lxxv). Tyner, Garrison, Jones, and those observers present at the Birdland set have no reason
to be disingenuous. Instead, these ‘others’ have something to offer to Coltrane presenting as the
self in this example. Tyner, Garrison, and Jones, are fellow improvisers, offering foot-holds of
sort for Coltrane to play off of, or responding and reacting in real time to the decisions he is
making as the band grooves through the head of the tune and solo sections. They offer value in
that they validate Coltrane’s self, and receive equal validation from Coltrane through the form of
interaction and trades throughout “Afro-Blue.” The audience, the other example of the Other,
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offers themselves as observers for the improvisation as a whole, recipients of the offering from
the self. “Rejoinder” also offers this ‘value’ based relationship that Merleau-Ponty has
established. Barwick and Mori, in turn, give and offer sounds, created from nothing, to one
another. Each individually, as the acting self, acknowledge that they are being offered a starting
point - something to grow from and feed off to create their own interpretations. There is
crossover, there is trade-off, but what remains is the value-based exchange of the offer. The self/
other relationship here is not the “desiring” that McMullen pointed toward but rather an equal
trade that establishes the self and other as equal. Improvisation levels the playing field for the
musician and musician, observer and performer. It is not a tiered relationship aside from the fact
that the other is outside the self, and the first acknowledgement from the self is for the self. In
improvisation, this disappears into a giving and receiving, a level playing field for all parties
involved or present.
The act of improvisation manifests a self/other relationship that not only makes equal self
and other, but allows for the self and other to interact in such a way that the ‘value’, as MerleauPonty coined it, is expressed through their interaction. With an understanding of Tracy
McMullen’s definition of the ‘improvisative,’ we can understand the interactions between Mori
and Barwick, as well as Coltrane and his band and the audience, with more clarity. Their
interactions exist in a space that does not require clear comprehension - as McMullen put it,
thinkability - nor conception of real time in order to be understood as a clear and definite
interaction between self and other. Rather, these interactions exemplify a sort of reflective
analysis of the self and other for the viewer, though the viewer, as a self, may not need
acknowledge this consciously. Through Barwick and Mori, we can recognize the pure interaction
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of an individual self, and an individual other. Both Mori and Barwick listen and respond to one
another, each establishing an ‘I’ through their sounds, while recognizing the value in what the
Other has to offer. As Merleau-Ponty put forth, the Other and the I have a value rather than
existence, and through the improvisative space, a space where thinkability and intelligibility are
not necessary for comprehension, the value is expressed as an offering. This offering is that of
sound to play off, respond to, grow from. In the case of Coltrane, his band offer him rhythm and
chordal support, while the audience serves as the observer, someone for Coltrane to perform for
and push his abilities. The self, here, is established through Coltrane’s melodic lines, sweeping
solo, and fact that he is the band leader. Anyone else in his band could be considered the self as
they, too, have distinctive sounds and are being offered melody and rhythm to respond to. The
self is established as separate from the other, but still deeply intertwined with the other. In the
improvisative, there is no separation of self and other. The self and other serve the same purpose
and offer the same amount to the ‘I’ or to the Other, but the distinction comes with whose
consciousness one is analyzing, or if you are one of the improvisers in the room.
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Conclusion
A musical relationship is a human relationship. The self and other constitute humanity,
reflecting two consciousnesses with mutual acknowledgement. Their presence in the
improvisative space allows for an understanding that improvised music is based in human
consciousness, making clear that a musical relationship, at least in this context, is a human
relationship.
The relationship between Self and Other in improvised music, viewed through the lens of
Merleau-Ponty’s established self and other in Phenomenology of Perception, allows for our
understanding that the self and other exist in an even, equal space of acknowledgement. The Self
is able to understand, through reflective analysis, that it exists in an external world and has
experiences within this world. Because of this, interacting with the Other is fair by the fact that
the Self and Other both have experiences in the world. Consciousness recognizes consciousness,
and consciousness can interact through the knowledge that they have a shared experience. Using
the example of Paul and Pierre, Merleau-Ponty establishes an interaction between two
consciousnesses who do not have to think twice about the fact that they both exist and are real. In
fact, this acknowledgement is almost unthinking as they understand, simply, that they are
interacting in a world and by that fact they both exist. Merleau-Ponty also asserts that the ‘I’ (the
self) and the Other [Autere] recognize they are not trapped in “phenomena” but rather have a
value, something to offer, in their acknowledgement. This is a two way street, making it clear
that there is no imbalance or scarcity in their interactions. Reflective analysis offers no concern
for the existence of an other, instead taking the Other at existing without question, allowing for
the self to focus on achieving a higher truth.
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The self and other make themselves present in improvisation through a space Tracy
McMullen calls the imrpovisative. She first establishes an understanding of self and other based
through Butlerian and Hegelian ideals, claiming that there is a “desire” that drives the self to find
acknowledgement form the other. However, as I argued, the self and other, exist with an equal
understanding and equal acknowledgement that creates a space for them to not desire. McMullen
then proposes the idea of the improvisative as a space existing outside of thinkability with a
‘lean’ toward the self as opposed to a focus on the other. This allows for us to understand
improvisation in a way of offering as opposed to taking, wherein the self offers sound to the
other, and vice versa. McMullen claims that the improvisative exists in the here and now, a time
different from presence, that requires attention and giving.
Gary Peters suggests that the improviser exists fully inside their work, as opposed to a
composer who exists and works with an outside perspective. This “inside,” however, allows for
the improviser to be fully within their work, to an extent, within the “here and now” that
McMullen suggests. Peters suggestion that there is a second order observation happening sparks
the question of who the observer is. The observer is the other improviser, the audience, giving
basis for the Self to go off, creating new melodies and more complex systems of engagement for
the Self and Other. Similarly, perhaps this internal existence can allow for the improviser to
experience a more specified reflective analysis, such that Merleau-Ponty suggest. Through an
exploration of the piece “Rejoinder,” improvised by Ikue Mori and Julianna Barwick, we can
understand that there is a level to which the self and other experience an equal trade of tonal
suggestion, pushing the other improviser toward reaction to the sound one is making. In the
Coltrane example, we see the improviser not only engage with the other improvisers, but also
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engage with the audience. Through this, Coltrane is offered rhythm and chordal support, but also
pressure from the audience to perform to his fullest extent. These two example show the
relationship between self and other by expounding upon the internal aspects of improvisation,
and relation to the ‘other’ in the space with them. By this, we are able to see how the self
acknowledges other, and other acknowledges self.
The relationship between the Self and Other in improvised music is mutual, ongoing, and
requests presence in the improvisative space. Consciousness is present through the
acknowledgement of self through what is revealed in an improvised piece of music, and
acknowledgement of other through interaction and trades of tonality and rhythm.
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